This paper studies the emergence of punitive moral legislation and its potential to catalyze broader culturally conservative changes. We focus on the case of alcohol prohibition in the United States - a landmark victory for Protestants who sought to codify their morals into law. Drawing on historical accounts, we argue that German and Irish immigration disrupted Protestant social order in rural America, spurring local alcohol bans as a defense against perceived norm-violations by immigrants. We confirm this using a shift-share instrumental variable design. We then examine how Prohibition affected the spread of other culturally conservative movements, particularly nativism. Studying the impact of staggered state-by-state dry law adoption on congressional voting behavior prior to the federal alcohol ban, we find significant increases in conservative voting on cultural issues, while voting on economic matters remained unchanged. This pattern is especially pronounced for anti-immigration votes. This historical case demonstrates how moral crusades emerge to protect social order and how their success can cause broader reactionary reforms.

Who is held accountable by transitional justice after fragmented conflict? Dominant theories of transitional justice assume a bipolar conflict between an authoritarian regime and the opposition. Yet some transitions involve multiple rival factions, complicating the logic of accountability. We argue that accountability after fragmented conflicts reflects not only the post-transition power balance but also each faction's relationship to the implementing party. We show evidence consistent with this framework by analyzing an original dataset of amnesty decisions from South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Using fixed effects regressions, matching techniques, and a sensitivity test for unobservable variables, we find a consistent positive bias in favor of ANC members (implementing party), but not other anti-apartheid activists (aligned without leverage). Additionally, we report higher rejection rates among IFP applicants (opponents without leverage), while former apartheid officials (opponents with leverage) were treated more leniently. We show that bias operated through judges directly appointed by the ANC. Our results extend transitional justice theory beyond bipolar frameworks and provide a foundation for analyzing post-conflict accountability in fragmented transitions.