This paper studies the emergence of stricter formal social control as a response to immigration. We argue that the arrival of norm-violating groups to places characterized by tight informal social control enforcement may mobilize locals to demand norm-policing legislation. Actual or perceived norm violating behavior among migrant groups may lower locals' trust in the efficacy of informal means of social control, making them switch to formal means to preserve the social order. We study this in the context of European migration to America and the rise of alcohol prohibition at the turn of the 20th century. Using a shift-share and a rail access instrumental variable design, we show that German and Irish immigration spurred local alcohol bans, primarily in rural areas with tighter cultures. This effect does not extend to other immigrant groups, nor appears to be a result of anti-Catholic nativist backlash.

Who is held accountable for human rights violations after a fragmented conflict? Dominant theories hold that post-conflict accountability depends on the outgoing regime's leverage over the new government. Yet multi-faction transitions complicate this logic. We argue accountability reflects not only the post-transition power balance but also each faction's relationship to the implementing party. Using an original dataset of amnesty decisions from South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, we find consistent bias favoring ANC members (implementing party), but not other anti-apartheid activists (aligned without leverage) or former apartheid officials (opponents with leverage). Instead, Inkatha applicants (opponents without leverage) faced higher rejection rates. Consistent with a career incentives mechanism, bias was driven by judging panels with less established legal careers. These results suggest a staffing dilemma: experienced officials are insulated from career pressures but politically compromised, while junior personnel appear more legitimate yet can be more susceptible to careerist incentives.

A growing literature shows that positive media portrayals of talented minorities can increase social acceptance of their group. Yet such portrayals may be rare or ineffective in hostile political environments. This paper  instead examines whether positive cues from dominant-group elites can reduce stigma against marginalized groups. I study the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the United Kingdom, a period of widespread hysteria toward homosexuals and people living with AIDS, leveraging Princess Diana’s highly publicized handshake with AIDS patients at the opening of Britain’s first dedicated AIDS ward as a natural experiment. The visit occurred during fieldwork for the British Social Attitudes Survey, which allows me to use an unexpected event during survey design for causal identification. I find that respondents expressed less punitive attitudes toward people living with AIDS in the days following Diana’s visit, with little change in attitudes toward homosexuals. These effects are concentrated among Conservative voters, who exhibited lower baseline acceptance of both groups and stronger attachment to the monarchy.