Why demand discriminatory laws when group inequalities are already entrenched? Existing explanations focus on threats from subordinate groups. I argue that mobilization can also arise from commitment problems within the dominant group. When dominant group members differ in their reliance on hierarchies, high-reliance members cannot trust low-reliance members to sustain them. Shocks that increase low-reliance members’ influence over policy mobilize high-reliance members to demand codification. I study mobilization for apartheid in South Africa using an original dataset of parliamentary speeches, legislative activity, and electoral results. I leverage the merger of two mainstream parties as a shock to expectations over future racial policy. Farming districts, dependent on racial control, responded by hardening their racial rhetoric, supporting segregationist bills, and voting for a pro-apartheid party. They also became more likely to invoke government unreliability to maintain racial order when justifying segregation. These results demonstrate that dominant groups mobilize for discriminatory legislation not only when subordinate groups threaten hierarchies, but also when they doubt their ability to preserve them.

This paper studies the emergence of stricter formal social control as a response to immigration. We argue that the arrival of norm-violating groups to places characterized by tight informal social control enforcement may mobilize locals to demand norm-policing legislation. Actual or perceived norm violating behavior among migrant groups may lower locals' trust in the efficacy of informal means of social control, making them switch to formal means to preserve the social order. We study this in the context of European migration to America and the rise of alcohol prohibition at the turn of the 20th century. Using a shift-share and a rail access instrumental variable design, we show that German and Irish immigration spurred local alcohol bans, primarily in rural areas with tighter cultures. This effect does not extend to other immigrant groups, nor appears to be a result of anti-Catholic nativist backlash.

Who is held accountable for human rights violations after a fragmented conflict? Dominant theories hold that post-conflict accountability depends on the outgoing regime's leverage over the new government. Yet multi-faction transitions complicate this logic. We argue accountability reflects not only the power balance but also each faction's relationship to the implementing party. We illustrate this framework using an original dataset of amnesty decisions from South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, comparing applicants assessed by the same judging panel for the same crime. Decisions favored the implementing party (ANC)--not other anti-apartheid factions without leverage (PAC/APLA), nor opponents holding leverage (apartheid officials). Opponents without leverage (Inkatha) were the most likely to be rejected. Consistent with a career-incentives mechanism, bias concentrated among judging panels with less established legal careers. Results show factions' relationship to the implementing party and their leverage jointly shape accountability in fragmented transitions, even without direct government intervention.

[Working paper]

A growing literature shows that positive media portrayals of talented minorities can increase acceptance of their group. Yet such portrayals may be rare or ineffective in hostile political environments. This paper asks instead whether positive cues from dominant-group elites can reduce stigma against marginalized groups. I study the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the United Kingdom, a period of widespread hysteria toward homosexuals and people living with AIDS, using Princess Diana's highly publicized handshake with AIDS patients as a natural experiment. The visit occurred during fieldwork for the British Social Attitudes Survey, which allows me to use an unexpected-event-during-survey design for causal identification. Respondents interviewed in the days after the visit expressed less punitive attitudes toward people living with AIDS, with limited change toward homosexuals. Effects are concentrated among groups more attached to the monarchy and Diana, such as Conservative voters, the wealthy, and women. Even in a context of heightened hysteria, this paper demonstrates that symbolic inclusion by a prominent dominant-group elite can improve attitudes toward minorities.